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Rules and Principles used in Logic
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Rules and
Principles used in
The Many
Worlds of Logic
Truth-Functional Logic
(Chapters
2-11 of The Many Worlds of Logic)
Truth-Tables
Conjunction
Disjunction
Conditional
P Q
P & Q
PQ P v Q
PQ P
É
Q
T T
T
TT T
TT T
T F
F
TF T
TF F
F T
F
FT T
FT T
F F
F
FF F
FF T
Biconditional
Negation
PQ P
º
Q
P ~P
TT
T
T F
TF
F
F T
FT
F
FF
T
Logical Status
·
A formula is a
truth-functional tautology
if and only if the final column of its truth-table is all T’s.
·
A formula is a
truth-functional contradiction if
and only if the final column of its truth-table is all F’s.
·
A formula is
truth-functionally contingent if
and only if the final column of its truth-table contains at least one T
and at least one F.
·
An argument is
truth-functionally valid if and
only if its truth-table contains no row with all true premises and a false
conclusion.
·
An argument is
truth-functionally invalid if and
only if its truth-table contains at least one row with all true premises and a
false conclusion.
·
Two formulas are
truth-functionally equivalent if
and only if the final columns on their respective truth-tables match.
Truth-functional Inference Rules
Disjunctive
Syllogism (DS)
Modus Ponens (MP)
From:
P
v Q
From: P
É
Q
and
~P
and P
You may infer: Q
You may infer: Q
Modus
Tollens (MT)
Hypothetical Syllogism (HS)
From:
P
É
Q
From: P
É
Q
and:
~Q
and Q
É
R
You may infer:
~P
You may infer: P
É
R
Simplification
(Simp)
Conjunction (Conj)
From: P
& Q
From: P
You may infer: P
and: Q
You may infer: Q
You may infer: P
& Q
Addition (Add)
Constructive Dilemma (CD)
From: P
From: P
É
Q
You may infer:
P
v Q
and: R
É
S
and: P
v R
You may infer: Q v
S
Rule of Indirect
Proof (IP)
Anywhere in a proof, you
may indent, assume ~ P, derive a contradiction, end the indentation, and
assert P.
Rule of
Conditional Proof (CP)
Anywhere in a proof, you
may indent, assume P, derive Q, end the indentation, and
assert P
É
Q.
Truth-functional Replacement Rules
Commutation (Comm)
A formula P v Q
may replace or be replaced by the corresponding formula Q v P.
A formula P & Q
may replace or be replaced by the corresponding formula Q & P.
Association
(Assoc)
A formula (P v Q)
v R may replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula
P
v (Q v R) .
A formula (P & Q)
& R may replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula P
& ( Q & R).
Double
Negation (DNeg)
A formula ~ ~ P may
replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula P.
DeMorgan
(DM)
Algorithm:
1. Change the ampersand to a
wedge or the wedge to an ampersand.
2. Negate each side of the
ampersand or wedge.
3. Negate the formula as a
whole.
Or:
A formula ~(P v Q) may
replace or be replaced by the corresponding formula ~P & ~Q
A formula ~(P & Q) may
replace or be replaced by the corresponding formula ~P v ~Q
A formula (P v Q)
may replace or be replaced by the corresponding formula ~(~P & ~Q)
A formula (P & Q) may
replace or be replaced by the corresponding formula ~(~P v ~Q)
Distribution
(Dist)
A formula P v
(Q
& R) may replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula (P
v Q) & (P v R).
A formula P & (Q
v R) may replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula (P
& Q) v (P & R).
Transposition
(Trans)
A formula P
É
Q may replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula ~ Q
É
~ P.
Implication
(Imp)
A formula PÉ
Q may replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula ~ P v
Q.
Exportation
(Exp)
A formula (P & Q
)
É
R may replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula P
É
(Q
É
R).
Tautology (Taut)
A formula P may
replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula P v P.
Equivalence
(Equiv)
A formula P
º
Q may replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula ( P
É
Q ) & ( Q
É
P).
A formula P
º
Q may replace or be replaced with the corresponding formula (
P
& Q ) v ( ~ P & ~ Q).
Categorical (Aristotelian) Logic
(Chapters
14-15 of The Many Worlds of Logic)
Sentence
Type:
Logical Form:
A
sentence (Universal Affirmative):
All S are P
E
sentence: (Universal Negative):
No S are P
I
sentence (Particular Affirmative)
Some S are P
O
sentence: (Particular Negative):
Some S are not P
S:
subject term P: predicate term
The Traditional
Square of Opposition
A
(All S are P)
¬contraries
®
E (No S are P)
I
(Some S are P)
¬subcontraries®
O (Some S are not P)
Add: Implication:
On side with arrows pointing down on each side.
Add: Subimplication:
On side with arrows pointing up on each side.
Converse,
Obverse, Contrapositive
To Produce
the Converse of a Categorical Statement:
Switch the subject and
predicate terms.
To Produce the
Obverse of a Categorical Statement:
1. Change the quality
(without changing the quantity) from affirmative to negative or negative
to affirmative.
2. Replace the predicate term
with its term complement.
To Produce the
Contrapositive of a Categorical Statement:
1. Switch the subject and
predicate.
2. Replace each term with its
term complement.
Equivalence
Equivalence relations between
opposing categorical statements:
Statement:
Converse:
A: All S are P
All P are S
E: No S are P
No P are S
(equivalent)
I: Some S are
P Some P are S
(equivalent)
O: Some S are
not P
Some P are not S
Statement:
Obverse:
A: All S are P
No S are non-P
(equivalent)
E.:No S are P
All S are non-P
(equivalent)
I: Some S are
P Some S are not non-P (equivalent)
O: Some S are
not P
Some S are non-P (equivalent)
Statement:
Contrapositive:
A: All S are P
All non-P are non-S (equivalent)
E: No S are P
No non-P are non-S
I: Some S are
P Some non-P are non-S
O: Some S are
not P
Some non-P are not non-S (equivalent)
Quantificational Logic
(Chapters
16-22 of The Many Worlds of Logic)
Quantificational Inference Rules
Universal
Instantiation (UI)
From a universal
quantification, one may infer any instantiation, provided that the instantiation
was produced by uniformly replacing each occurrence of the variable that was
bound by the quantifier with a constant or John Doe name.
Existential
Generalization (EG)
From a sentence containing a
constant or a John Doe name, you may infer any corresponding existential
generalization, provided that: (a) the variable used in the generalization does
not already occur in the sentence generalized upon; (b) the generalization
results by replacing at least one occurrence of the constant or John Doe name
with the variable, and no other changes are made.
Existential
Instantiation (E I)
From an existential
quantification, you may infer an instantiation, provided that (a) each
occurrence of the variable bound by the quantifier in the existential
quantification is uniformly replaced with a John Doe name and no other changes
are made; (b) the John Doe name does not appear in any earlier line of the
deduction.
Universal
Generalization (UG)
From a sentence containing a
John Doe name, one may infer the corresponding universal generalization,
provided that (a) the John Doe name that is replaced by a variable does not
occur in any preceding line derived by EI. (b) the generalization results by
replacing each occurrence of the John Doe name with the variable (and no other
changes are made), ( c ) the variable you use in the generalization
does not already appear in the sentence you are generalizing from, (d) the John
Doe name does not appear in any assumed premise that has not already been
discharged.
Quantificational Replacement Rules
Quantifier
Exchange (QE)
If P contains either a
universal or an existential quantifier, P may be replaced by or may
replace a sentence that is exactly like P except that one quantifier has
been switched for the other in accord with the (a) - ( c ) below:
(a) switch one quantifier for
the other.
(b) negate each side of the
quantifier
(c ) cancel out any double
negatives that result.
Identity
Identity A (Id A)
At any step in a proof, you may assert (x) (x =
x).
Identity B (Id B)
If c and d
are two constants or John Doe names and a line of a proof asserts that the
individual designated by c is identical with the individual designated by
d, then you may carry down and rewrite any available line of the proof
replacing any or all occurrences of c with d or any or all
occurrences of d with c. A line of a proof is available unless it
is within the scope of a discharged assumption.
Modal Logic
(Chapters
23-24 of The Many Worlds of Logic)
Modal
Inference Rules
Box Removal (BR):
From a sentence P, you may
infer the corresponding sentence P.
Possibilization
(Poss): From a
sentence P you may infer the corresponding sentence
à
P.
Modal Modus
Ponens (MMP): From
P
®
Q and the corresponding sentence P you may infer the corresponding
sentence Q.
Modal Modus
Tollens (MMT):
From P
®
Q and the corresponding sentence ~Q, you may infer the
corresponding sentence ~P.
Modal
Hypothetical Syllogism (MHS):
From P
®
Q and the corresponding sentence Q
®
R you may infer the corresponding sentence P
®
R.
The Possibility
to Necessity Rule (P to N)
From :
P
®
Q
and
à
P
You may infer:
Q Provided that: the formula instantiating Q is itself a modally
closed formula.
The
Necessitation Rule (Nec)
At any point in a proof, you may indent and construct a "necessitation subproof"
in which every line is either justified by the reiteration rule (below)
or follows from previous lines of the subproof by a valid rule of inference. You
may then end the indentation, draw a line around the indented lines, write down
any line derived within the subproof, and then prefix a box to that line. (Write
as justification "Nec" and the line numbers of the subproof.)
Reiteration
You may reiterate into a necessitation subproof any line provided that the
entire line consists of just one modally closed formula and the formula does not
lie within the scope of a discharged assumption or a terminated nec intro
subproof. (Write as justification "Reit.")
Tautology
Necessitation (Taut Nec)
If a statement P is proven tautological,
we may infer from this a statement P. (Write as justification “Taut Nec"
and the line the tautology appears on.)
Modal
Replacement Rules
Hook Conversion
(HC):
A sentence of the form P
® Q may replace or be
replaced with the corresponding sentence
(P
ÉQ ).
Double Hook
Conversion (DHC):
A sentence of the form P
«
Q may replace or be replaced with the corresponding sentence
( P
ºQ).
Modal
Equivalence (Mod Equiv):
A sentence of the form [(
P
®
Q & (Q
®
P )] may replace or be replaced with the corresponding sentence
( P
¬
®
Q).
Diamond Exchange
(DE):
If a sentence P
contains either a box or a diamond, P may be replaced by or may
replace a sentence that is exactly like P except that the box has been
switched for the diamond or vice versa in accord with the (a) - ( c ) below:
a. Add a tilde to each side of
the box or diamond.
b. Trade the box for a diamond
or the diamond for a box.
c. Cancel out any double
negatives that result.
Reduction
(Red)
Any sequence of iterated monadic modal operators in a formula may be reduced to
the last member on the right, and the resulting reduced formula may replace the
original formula anywhere within a proof. (Write as justification "Red" and the
line of the reduced formula.)
Definition
(Chapter 12
of The Many Worlds of Logic)
Definition
by genus and difference An
important type of analytic definition in which a species or kind of entity is
defined in two steps: a) we specify a general class or genus to which all the
objects in the species belong; and (b) we narrow this down by indicating how
this species differs from other species in the same genus.
Extensional
(or “denotative”) definition A
definition that assigns meaning to a word or phrase by giving examples of what
the word or phrase denotes. There are three types:
Enumerative
definitions assign meaning by naming
or listing members of the extension.
Ostensive
(or “demonstrative”) definitions
involve pointing or gesturing at an item
belonging to the extension.
A
definition by subclass assigns
meaning by naming or listing subclasses of the class of entities denoted by a
term.
Extensional
(or “denotative”) meaning of a term
The class of objects to which the term may correctly be applied, that is, the
members of the class that the term denotes.
Intensional
(or “connotative”) definition A
definition that assigns meaning by indicating the qualities or attributes a word
or phrase connotes, that is, by listing the properties that a entity must have
if the word or phrase is to apply to it. There are three common types:
A
synonymous definition assigns meaning to a
word by providing a synonym.
An
operational definition assigns meaning to a
word or phrase by specifying an operation or set of procedures that determines
whether the word or phrase is applied to a entity or not.
An
analytical definition attempts to explain
the meaning of a word or phrase by specifying the characteristics possessed in
common by those items to which the word or phrase applies.
Intensional
(or “connotative”) meaning The qualities
or attributes the term connotes, that is, the common attributes or
characteristics that lead us to apply the term.
Lexical
meaning The commonly understood
meaning of a word or phrase.
Lexical
Definition A definition that reports
a word’s commonly understood meaning.
Persuasive
Definition A definition that aims to
influence attitudes.
Precising
Definition A definition that provides
a more precise meaning for a word that formerly had a vague but established
meaning. The more precise meaning provides additional guidance as to how the
word is to be applied in various borderline cases.
Stipulative
Definition A definition that
constitutes a new meaning for a word or phrase.
Theoretical
Definition A definition that
characterizes the nature of something. Such a definition provides a theoretical
picture of an entity, that is, a way of understanding the entity.
A Summary of
the Fallacies
(Chapter 13
of The Many Worlds of Logic)
Fallacies of No Evidence
Argument
Against the Person (argumentum ad
hominem) This fallacy is committed when you attack a person’s character or
personal circumstances in order to oppose or discredit their argument or
viewpoint. Also:
Tu Quoque Fallacy
(“you’re one, too”) A type of abusive ad hominem that attempts to discredit a
person’s viewpoint or position by charging the person with hypocrisy or
inconsistency. Essentially, the charge is, “We don’t need to take his argument
seriously because he doesn’t practice what he preaches.”
Guilt by association Fallacy
A type of abusive ad hominem in which one person attacks a second person’s
associates in order to discredit the person and thereby his view or argument.
Appeal to
Force (argumentum ad baculum,
literally “argument from the stick”) A fallacy committed when an arguer appeals
to force or to the threat of force to make someone accept a conclusion.
Appeal to
Pity (argumentum ad misericordiam) A
fallacy committed when the arguer attempts to evoke pity from the audience and
tries to use that pity to make the audience accept a conclusion.
Appeal to
the People (argumentum ad populum) A
fallacy committed when an arguer attempts to arouse and use the emotions of a
group to win acceptance for a conclusion.
Snob Appeal
Fallacy This is committed when the
arguer claims that if you will adopt a particular conclusion, this will place
you in a special, elite group or will make you better than everyone else.
Fallacy of
Irrelevant Conclusion (ignoratio
elenchi, meaning “ignorance of the proof”) A fallacy in which someone puts
forward premises in support of a stated conclusion, but the premises actually
support a different conclusion.
Begging the
Question Fallacy (petitio principii,
meaning “postulation of the beginning”) This is committed when someone employs
the conclusion (usually in some disguised form) as a premise in support of that
same conclusion.
Appeal to
Ignorance (argumentum ad ignorantium)
In this fallacy, someone argues that a proposition is true simply on the grounds
that it has not been proven false (or that a proposition must be false because
it has not been proven true).
Red Herring
Fallacy A fallacy committed when the
arguer tries to divert attention from his opponent’s argument by changing the
subject and drawing a conclusion about the new subject.
Genetic
Fallacy A fallacy committed when
someone attacks a view by disparaging the view’s origin or the manner in which
the view was acquired.
Poisoning
the Well The use of emotionally
charged language to discredit an argument or position before arguing against it.
Fallacies of Little Evidence
Fallacy of
Accident A fallacy committed when a
general rule is applied to a specific case, but because of extenuating
circumstances, the case is an exception to the general rule and the general rule
should not be applied to the case.
Straw Man
Fallacy A fallacy committed when an
arguer (a) summarizes his opponent’s argument but the summary is an exaggerated,
ridiculous, or oversimplified representation of the opponent’s argument that
makes the opposing argument appear illogical or weak; (b) the arguer refutes the
weakened, summarized argument; and (c) the arguer concludes that the opponent’s
actual argument has been refuted.
Appeal to
Questionable Authority Fallacy
(argumentum ad verecundiam) When someone attempts to support a claim by
appealing to an authority that is untrustworthy, or when the authority is
unqualified, or prejudiced, or has a motive to lie.
Fallacy of
Hasty Generalization A fallacy
committed when someone draws a generalization about a group on the basis of
observing an unrepresentative sample of the group.
False Cause
Fallacy A fallacy involving faulty
reasoning about causality. Also:
In a Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc fallacy
(“after this, therefore, because of this”)
someone concludes that A is the cause of B simply on the grounds that A preceded
B in time.
In a Non Causa Pro Causa fallacy (“not
the cause for the cause”) someone claims that A is the cause of B, when in fact
(1) A is not the cause of B, but (2) the mistake is not based merely on one
thing coming after another thing. One version of this fallacy is the fallacy of
accidental correlation: the arguer concludes that one thing is the cause of
another thing from the mere fact that the two phenomena are correlated.
Slippery
Slope Fallacy (or “domino argument”)
In this fallacy, someone objects to a position P on the grounds that P will set
off a chain reaction leading to trouble; but no reason is given for supposing
the chain will actually occur. Metaphorically, if we adopt a certain position,
we will start sliding down a slippery slope and we won’t be able to stop until
we slide all the way to the bottom (where some bad result lies in wait).
Fallacy of
Weak Analogy A fallacy committed when
an analogical argument is presented but the analogy is too weak to support the
conclusion.
Fallacy of
False Dilemma A fallacy committed
when someone assumes there are only two alternatives, eliminates one of these
two, and concludes in favor of the second, when more than the two stated
alternatives exist, but have not been considered.
Fallacy of
Suppressed Evidence In this fallacy,
evidence that would count heavily against the conclusion is left out of the
argument or is covered up.
Fallacy of
Special Pleading In this fallacy, the
arguer applies a principle to someone else’s case but makes a special exception
to the principle in his own case.
Fallacies of Language
Fallacy of
Equivocation In this fallacy, a
particular word or phrase is used with one meaning in one place, that word or
phrase is used with another meaning in another place, and what has been
established on the basis of the one meaning is regarded as established with
respect to the other meaning. As a result, the conclusion depends on a word (or
phrase) being used in two different senses in the argument. The premises are
true on one interpretation of the word, but the conclusion follows only from a
different interpretation.
Fallacy of
Amphiboly A fallacy containing a
statement that is ambiguous because of its grammatical construction. One
interpretation makes the statement true, the other makes it false. If the
ambiguous statement is interpreted one way, the premise is true but the
conclusion is false; but if the ambiguous statement is interpreted the other
way, the premise is false. The meaning must shift if the argument is going to go
from a true premise to a true conclusion. If the meaning is not allowed to shift
during the argument, either the argument has false a premise or it is invalid.
Fallacy of
Composition A fallacy in which
someone uncritically assumes that what is true of a part of a whole is also true
of the whole.
Fallacy of
Division A fallacy in which someone
uncritically assumes that what is true of the whole must be true of the parts.
Induction
(Chapters
25-26 of The Many Worlds of Logic)
Analogical
argument
An argument in which (a) an
analogy is asserted between two things or kinds of things, X and Y; (b) it is
then asserted that X has a particular feature and that Y is not known not
to have the feature; (c) it is concluded that Y probably also has the
feature. More formally:
1. X has features ABCD.
2. Y has features ABCD.
3. X also has feature E.
4. Y is not known not
to have E.
5. Therefore, Y probably
has feature E as well.
The more features in
common, the stronger the argument. The higher the degree of causal or
statistical relevance between the features cited in the analogy and the feature
cited in the conclusion, the stronger the argument.
Enumerative
Induction
An argument in which
premises about observed individuals or cases are used as a basis for a
generalization about unobserved individuals or cases.
In one variation, a
sample of a group is observed and is found
to have feature X. It is then concluded that the group probably also has
feature X.
The more random the sample,
the stronger the argument. The more heterogenous the sample, the stronger the
argument. The larger the sample, the stronger the argument.
In another variation, a
series is extended:
A is an F and has feature G
B is an F and has feature G
C is an F and has feature G
D is an F and has feature G
Therefore, the next F
encountered will probably have feature G.
The more random the series,
the stronger the argument. The longer the series, the stronger the argument.
Inference
to the Best Explanation (also called “abduction”)
1. The argument cites one or more
purported facts, which, it is claimed, are in need of explanation.
2. Possible explanations of
the facts are considered.
3. It is argued that a particular explanation is
the best or most reasonable explanation of the facts.
4. It is concluded that
this explanation is probably the correct explanation.
Comparing explanations
- A good explanation is
internally consistent—it contains no self-contradictory elements.
- A good explanation is
externally consistent--it does not contradict already established
facts and already proven theories.
- A good explanation
explains the widest possible range of relevant data.
- The more completely
the explanation explains the data, the better the explanation.
- If all else is equal,
the potential explanation that explains more of the relevant data is
preferable.
- If two potential
explanations explain the same range of data and are otherwise equal, except
that one explanation is simpler than the other, the simpler
explanation is preferable. (One explanation is simpler than another
if it makes reference to fewer entities or contains fewer explanatory
principles or explanatory elements.)
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